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Civil Procedure: Distinguishing First Amendment
Issues for Purposes of Res Judicata-
A Problem in Semantics
Appellants were arrested for distributing political pamphlets
in Central Park without first obtaining the permit required by
section 13 of the New York City park rules.' They were con-
victed in a consolidated proceeding before the Criminal Court
of the County of New York and sentenced to pay a fine of ten
dollars or spend two days in jail. After appellants paid the fine,
their convictions were affirmed without opinion by the Appellate
Term, and their application for leave to appeal to the New York
Court of Appeals was denied. Electing not to petition the United
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, appellants brought
a civil rights action2 in federal district court against the city and
several individual city officials, seeking a declaratory judgment
that section 13 and the permit dispensing system 3 violated their
1. Section 13 of the park rules states:
No person shall hold any meeting, perform any ceremony, make
an address, exhibit or distribute any sign, placard, declaration
or appeal of any description, in any park or park-street, except
by permit from Parks, Recreation and Cultural Affairs Admin-
istration. Upon application, the Administrator shall issue such
permit unless: (1) the use for which the permit is sought would
substantially interfere with park use and enjoyment by the pub-
lic; (2) the location selected is not suitable because of special
landscaping and planning; (3) the location is not suitable be-
cause it is a specialized area including, but not limited to, a zoo,
swimming pool, or skating rink; (4) the date and time requested
have previously been allotted by permit. Whenever a permit
is denied, alternative suitable locations and dates shall be offered
to the applicant.
NEw Yoax Crry PARK RuLEs AND REGauATioNs § 11(a), quoted in Par-
ties' Joint Appendix on Appeal at A-14. Section 13 had been construed
by the state courts to apply to the distribution of pamphlets. See Thistle-
thwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 343 n.2 (2d Cir. 1974) (dissent-
ing opinion). The New York City Charter authorizes the Administration
to promulgate and enforce rules and regulations for the parks and further
provides that any violation of the rules shall constitute a criminal of-
fense. NEW YoRK, N.Y., Crry CHARTE ANN. § 2003(2) (j) (1972).
2. The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
3. Section 11 (a) of the park rules, the basic regulation governing
the permit dispensing system, provides in pertinent part:
A permit may be granted upon such terms and conditions as the
Administrator shall reasonably impose. Every permit shall be
of a duration reasonably deemed appropriate by the Administra-
tor for the use of the park and its facilities by the public. The
Administrator shall prescribe and make readily available forms
of application for permits and copies of the Rules and Regula-
tions in force.
NEw YoRK CITY PARK RULEs AND REGULATIONS § 11 (a), quoted in Parties'
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first amendment rights and an injunction prohibiting further en-
forcement of section 13 against them. The district court dis-
missed the complaint on the ground that the appellants had fully
litigated the claim in the state criminal proceeding.4 Affirming
the dismissal, the court of appeals held that appellants' suit was
barred by res judicata because the issues had already been liti-
gated and determined against them in the state court. Thistleth-
waite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. de-
nied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3355 (Dec. 24, 1974).5
Joint Appendix on Appeal at A-13. The Administrator had imple-
mented this section by promulgating permit application forms incorpo-
rating the following paragraphs:
[Paragraph 4] It is prohibited to distribute any pamphlets,
handbills, placards signs or any other appeals'.. within any
park or on any park street.
[Paragraph 9] The permit ... is revocable at any time in the
absolute discretion of the Commissioner.
497 F.2d at 344 n.4.
4. Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 362 F. Supp. 88 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
5. The court also held that (1) it was not impelled by the policies
of section 1983 to deny traditional full faith and credit to the state judg-
ment, and (2) since the appellants had apparently elected to litigate the
constitutional issues in state court, it was unnecessary to decide squarely
whether a defendant's need to assert constitutional defenses in a state
criminal proceeding should cause a federal court to apply res judicata
principles less extensively in a subsequent civil rights suit.
Although resolution of the first issue has important implications for
the future of judicial federalism, the Supreme Court has thus far refused
to consider it, see Florida State Bd. of Dentistry v. Mack, 401 U.S. 960
(1971) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); in the absence
of guidance, the lower courts have adhered to the traditional rule that
state court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in the federal
courts. See, e.g., Williams v. Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 327 (7th Cir. 1972);
Metros v. United States Dist. Court for Dist. of Colo., 441 F.2d 313, 316-
18 (10th Cir. 1970); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1273-74 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970); Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclu-
sive in Section 1983 Litigation in a Federal Court, 27 OxLA. L. REV. 185
(1974). One commentator has recently argued for the substantial abroga-
tion of the full faith and credit principle when res judicata problems
arise in section 1983 suits. McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983:
Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Claims (pt. 2), 60
VA. L. REv. 250 (1974). Although the Burger Court seems strongly in-
clined to allow state courts to assume responsibility for the protection
of federal constitutional rights in state criminal proceedings, Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971),
the Younger abstention cases do not speak directly to the propriety of
federal cognizance after the state criminal proceeding has run its course.
At that point, "principles of res judicata and federalism may be subordi-
nated to the policies of federal habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1970),
which provides an avenue for relitigating constitutional issues in federal
court. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953). See also Kaufman v. United
§tates, 394 U.S. 217 (1969) (federal prisoner). Relitigation pursuant to
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"Res judicata" is the general term used to'describe the bind-
ing effect of a judgment in one action upon a party who subse-
quently becomes involved in another action concerning closely
related matters.0 The two branches of the res judicata doctrine
have commonly been called merger and bar,7 and collateral es-
toppel," but one commentator has suggested the more descriptive
section 1983 jurisdiction, however, would seem to represent a somewhat
greater strain on federal-state comity, at least to the extent that section
1983 is not subject to the unique historical considerations and doctrinal
limitations associated with habeas corpus. See generally Preiser v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Rosenberg
v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 872 (1973).
Addressing itself briefly to the second issue, the court failed to ex-
amine the significance of the lack of an opportunity to elect a federal
forum, but instead focused on very dubious evidence of election of the
state forum in order to avoid the issue. 497 F.2d at 342-43, 344 n.6 (dis-
senting opinion). McCormack suggests that great weight should gener-
ally be given to the factor of election of forum when considering whether
a litigant should be allowed to relitigate an issue of federal civil rights
in a federal forum. McCormack, supra, at 274-75. Prior case law, how-
ever, does not illuminate the significance of the fact that a criminal de-
fendant has no opportunity to elect the forum in which he is tried. In
the context of section 1983 litigation, the election problem initially arose
when a plaintiff brought a civil rights action without giving a state
forum an opportunity to decide an unsettled question of state law, see
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), and the federal court chose to ab-
stain and remit the plaintiff to the state court under the abstention doc-
trine announced in Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941). If the state court not only resolved the unsettled issues of state
law but also decided the federal constitutional issues, the question arose
whether the plaintiff was barred under res judicata principles from re-
turning to the federal court. Such a result seemed unfair, since the
plaintiff had been forced into state court despite his initial choice of a
federal forum. In England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners,
375 U.S. 411 (1964), the Court resolved this issue, essentially a problem
in the judicial administration of the abstention doctrine, by holding that
the plaintiff could return to the federal court unless he had in fact
clearly and explicitly elected to have the state court decide the federal
issues. On the other hand, in the context of a state criminal proceeding,
as in Thistlethwaite, the civil rights plaintiff obviously does not make
the initial choice of forum. In fact, if he tries to circumvent the state
criminal proceedings, he will meet with another abstention rule prohibit-
ing interference with already commenced criminal proceedings. See
Steffel v. Thompson, supra; Younger v. Harris, supra. Thus, it seems
that the Thistlethwaite court was justified in its uncertainty over the ap-
plicability of the election doctrine to prior state criminal proceedings.
6. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597-98 (1948);
J.E. Bernard & Co. v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 496, 497 (Cust. Ct.
1971); F. JAMES, CIWL PaocEDuRE § 11.9, at 549 (1965) [hereinafter cited
as JAMES]; lB J. MooRE, FEDmiAL PRACTicE f 0.405[l] (2d ed. 1974).
7. The terms "merger" and "bar" refer to the two possible effects
of a judgment on the merits upon a subsequent action involving essenti-
ally the same parties and the same claim. See JAMES § 11.9, at 550.
8. Collateral estoppel operates to prevent one or more of the par-
ties to a prior suit from relitigating in a subsequent action any of the
19751
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terms "preclusion," "claim preclusion," and "issue preclusion" for
the general doctrine and its respective branches.9
The Thistlethwaite majority held that the civil rights claim
was precluded because the state court had previously determined
that the basic section 13 permit requirement and the accompany-
ing permit dispensing system were constitutional both facially
and as applied to appellants; 10 thus, all the first amendment is-
sues raised by appellants had been decided against them in the
state court." The appealing simplicity of the majority's applica-
tion of preclusion principles was rejected by dissenting Judge
Oakes, who argued that the constitutionality of section 13, as im-
plemented by section 11(a) of the regulations and paragraphs
4 and 9 of the permit application form, and the constitutionality
of those provisions as applied to the appellants were analyti-
cally distinct issues asserted for the first time in the federal ac-
tion.' 2 Litigation of these issues therefore appeared to him to
be permissible under the recognized rules of issue preclusion."3
Although the Thistlethwaite majority apparently embraced the
concept of a distinction between "facial" and "as applied" re-
view,' 4 it failed to consider clearly the application of the distinc-
issues necessarily resolved in the first suit. Cromwell v. County of Sac,
94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876). To determine whether the new action involves
an attempt to relitigate a previously decided issue, courts generally ex-
amine the pleadings and, if necessary, the record in the prior proceeding.
See, e.g., Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 846 (1970).
9. See Vestal, Rationale of Preclusion, 9 ST. Louis U.L.J. 29 (1964);
Vestal & Coughenour, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables: Criminal
Prosecutions, 19 VAim. L. REv. 683 (1966).
10. A law is evaluated "on its face" to determine whether there are
any circumstances in which it might, if enforced literally according to
its terms, prohibit or restrict conduct beyond the extent necessary to fur-
ther some legitimate legislative purpose. Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
mingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 171
(1952); Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 460 (1945). In
contrast to a "facial" attack, an "as applied" inquiry focuses not on ab-
stract possibilities, but on the actual application of the law to a particu-
lar factual situation. Cf. Solesbee v. Balkom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). See gen-
erally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L.
REv. 844 (1970).
11. 497 F.2d at 341-42.
12. Id. at 344 & n.6. Judge Oakes applied issue rather than claim
preclusion. See note 35 infra and accompanying text.
13. 497 F.2d at 343. One who seeks preclusion of an issue must
show that the issue was actually litigated and determined and that the
determination was necessary to the result in the prior action. Exhibitors
Poster Exch., Inc. v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 421 F.2d 1313, 1319 (5th
Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 991 (1971); Palma v. Powers, 295 F.
Supp. 924, 934 (N.D. Ill. 1969); JAMEs § 11.18, at 576.
14. 497 F.2d at 341.
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tion to the specific facts and issues in Thistlethwaite. While
Judge Oakes offered a considerably more incisive analysis, he
perhaps failed to expose completely the semantic imprecision in
the majority opinion. This imprecision can be more convincingly
demonstrated by a systematic examination of the first amend-
ment issues associated with each of four modes in which section
13 might formally have been challenged in state court: (1) on
its face, (2) as applied to appellants, (3) as "implemented" by
section 11(a) of the regulations and paragraphs 4 and 9 of the
permit application form, and (4) as so "implemented" and applied
to appellants. Such an examination clarifies important distinc-
tions among the issues by approaching each mode of attack in
functional terms: an effective inquiry should focus both on the
relevant evidentiary facts tending to support a holding of uncon-
stitutionality and on the consequences of such a holding. 5
Determination of the facial validity of section 13, the first
mode of inquiry, would raise the issue whether the city may con-
stitutionally require a permit to distribute leaflets in the park.10
Such a determination would turn on questions of the legitimacy
of the legislative purpose and the existence of a definite and ob-
jective relationship between the legislative purpose and the per-
mit requirement.1'7 A decision by the state court that section
13 was facially unconstitutional would have compelled the city
either to draft an acceptable permit requirement or to employ
some other regulatory method less restrictive than a permit
15. Although the conventional preclusion tests focus only on evi-
dentiary facts, see note 8 supra & note 38 infra, in the first amendment
context, inquiry into consequences serves to illuminate further the sig-
nificance of different evidentiary facts.
16. 497 F.2d at 344 (dissenting opinion). On motion by the appel-
lants to dismiss the charges in the state trial court, the following ex-
change occurred:
Mr. Olasov: Our contention is that the Parks Department
may not promulgate regulations restricting the right of indi-
viduals such as [the appellants] to distribute leaflets.
Now, we have no doubt at all that there are other regula-
tions that the Parks Department could promulgate ....
The Court: I'm confining myself and I ask you to confine
yourself to Section 13, just 13.
You contend that that violates their constitutional rights?
Mr. Olasov: Yes, sir.
The Court: My decision right now is going to be that I deny
your motion on that ground, and I hold that the Parks Depart-
ment has the right to make rules and regulations with regard
to conduct, more specifically with regard to Section 13.
Parties' Joint Appendix on Appeal at A-29.




system. Since this initial determination was clearly necessary
to the state conviction, preclusion of the issue was appropriate.
The issue raised under the second mode of attack, the validity
of section 13 as applied to appellants, seems also to have been
decided in the state proceeding. In denying the appellants' mo-
tion to dismiss the prosecution, the state court apparently re-
jected their argument that, because they had distributed pam-
phlets by themselves rather than as members of a sizable group
and thus did not create any of the dangers of disruption at which
the regulations were aimed, section 13 was unconstitutional as
applied to them.' 8 If the decision on this issue had been in appel-
lants' favor, the general validity of the section 13 permit require-
ment would not have been affected, but the city would have been
placed on notice that the permit requirement could not be en-
forced against the appellants or any other lone distributors of
handbills. 9
The majority apparently refused to address itself to the dis-
tinct first amendment issue raised under the third mode of at-
tack.20 Judge Oakes, on the other hand, protested:
But here appellants contest the constitutionality of § 13 as imple-
mented by § 11 (a) and the provisions of the permit application
which, taken together, facially appear to prohibit any distri-
bution of pamphlets or handbills in parks .... 21
Although it is unlikely that he would have met with any greater
success, Judge Oakes could have carried his observation one step
further by noting that a decision that the language22 cumula-
tively granted too much discretion to the responsible officials
would not have affected the validity of section 13, but instead
would have compelled the city to implement section 13 with a
facially acceptable permit dispensing system by promulgating a
new dispensing regulation and a new application form. It is
18. A law regulating a certain type of conduct or class of persons
can be attacked as applied on the ground that the circumstances of the
particular person to whom the law has been applied are so different from
others in the regulated class that enforcement in such circumstances is
outside the original purpose of the law. See United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938). This same attack could be
mounted before the law is actually applied and would then appear in
the guise of a challenge for facial overbreadth. See Note, supra note 10.
Thus, the distinction between facial and as applied attack is by no means
absolute.
19. See Note, supra note 10, at 845.
20. See 497 F.2d at 341 ("A perusal of the briefs submitted to the
Appellate Term cannot fail to convince that the whole regulatory system
was assailed... .").
21. Id. at 344.
22. See notes 1 and 3 supra.
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doubtful that this issue had been litigated in the state criminal
proceeding; the scope of the original dispute would naturally
have been limited to whether appellants, who did not know that
a permit was necessary, could be convicted for distributing liter-
ature without obtaining one. If the federal court was indeed
unsure whether this issue had previously been litigated, then it
should have considered the issue, because appellees had not met
their burden of proof on the question of preclusion.23
Finally, in the fourth mode of attack, appellants might have
asserted in state court that section 11(a) of the regulations and
paragraphs 4 and 9 of the permit application form were being
unconstitutionally applied by city officials to deny permits.24
Even if all the regulations were facially valid, the officials may
have been denying permits for reasons other than those author-
ized in section 13.25 A determination of this issue thus would
have entailed a factual inquiry into the actual exercise of discre-
tion by the responsible officials. A decision that the officials
were unconstitutionally "censoring" permit applicants would not
have affected the facial validity of either section 13 or section
11(a), but would instead have advised the city that the regula-
tory scheme would be unenforceable to the extent it was ad-
ministered unconstitutionally. In order to provide a more ade-
quate remedy, a court in such a case could issue an injunction
against further abuse of administrative authority, thereby
threatening the responsible officials with contempt of court pro-
ceedings should they continue to deny permits arbitrarily.26 In
fact, the appellants in Thistlethwaite had not attempted to obtain
a permit until after the last state appeal of their conviction.27
23. The litigant who seeks to benefit from issue preclusion has the
burden of proof that the issue is precluded by a prior judgment. Kauff-
man v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846
(1970).
24. Raising this issue of constitutionality in district court, appel-
lants' amended complaint stated that, under the authority of certain park
officials, "permits to distribute pamphlets . . . within any park . . . of
the City, purportedly required by Section 13 of the Rules and Regula-
tions, have not been, and are not being, issued by the Administration."
Parties' Joint Appendix on Appeal at A-7.
25. See 497 F.2d at 344 n.6 (dissenting opinion).
26. See Swift & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 311, 326 (1928); Lance
v. Plummer, 353 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 929(1966).
27. The district court had apparently suggested that one of the ap-
pellants apply for a permit before their motion for preliminary injunctive
relief was heard. Parties' Joint Appendix on Appeal at A-50 to A-51.
After some delay, one appellant submitted his permit application and
told the official that he wished to distribute leaflets in Central Park. He
19751 629
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Therefore, the validity of the actual application of section 11(a)
and paragraphs 4 and 9 specifically to the appellants could not
possibly have been at issue in the state court.
2 8
Thus, the issues raised under the third and fourth modes of
attack are distinct from the issue of the validity of section 13
either on its face or as applied. According to the principles of
issue preclusion, appellants should not have been precluded from
litigating these two issues in the federal civil rights action.
An alternative justification for the majority result is that
it was proper to apply principles of claim preclusion.29  Unlike
issue preclusion, claim preclusion prevents a matter from being
litigated even though it was not actually put in issue and deter-
mined in the first action if it should have been considered as
an aspect of the prior claim.30 It is not totally clear from the
majority opinion, however, whether the court intended to apply
claim preclusion. At one point the majority indicated that it was
applying "the rules of collateral estoppel," or issue preclusion; 31
yet, at another point, it stated that "the gist of the current suit
is that the regulations are unconstitutional,"3 2 thereby suggesting
a concern with the general scope of the prior claim and an appli-
cation of claim preclusion.33 Since the majority never explicitly
indicated that any issue was precluded because it should have
been tried in the prior suit,3 4 it seems on the whole more probable
later described to the district court what transpired: "And he said 'Noth-
ing doing'. And he turned the leaflet over... and he said, 'Well, number
four [paragraph 4 of the permit application] says there is-you are not
allowed to distribute leaflets in the park."' Parties' Joint Appendix on
Appeal at A-53. See notes 1 and 3 supra. See also 497 F.2d at 344 n.6
(dissenting opinion).
28. See id. at 343 n.3 (dissenting opinion).
29. The district court had based its holding upon claim preclusion,
stating that "[tihe aspects now cited as additional are inherent in the
arguments presented to the state court and, in any event, res judicata
precludes relitigation of any aspect of the claim." 362 F. Supp. at 94.
30. Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352-53 (1876).
31. 497 F.2d at 342. See also note 20 supra.
32. 497 F.2d at 341 (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 154 F. Supp. 64, 67 (D. Del.
1954). Moreover, the district court in Thristlethwaite had applied claim
rather than issue preclusion, see note 29 supra, and had not actually de-
termined which issues had been raised in the state court. Thus, if the
court of appeals really intended to apply issue preclusion, it would have
realized that the record was not adequately developed, and remanded the
case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing to establish exactly
which issues had been decided in the state proceeding. See Williams v.
Liberty, 461 F.2d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1972); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d
1270, 1276 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 (1970).
34. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
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that the majority rested its result on an application of issue pre-
clusion even though that result seems more consistent with the
rationale of claim preclusion.
A further indication of the majority's confusion is that it
failed to advance any justification for the application of issue
rather than claim preclusion. In this regard, Judge Oakes sug-
gested a lack of strict mutuality of parties.35 According to the
mutuality requirement, a party is entitled to ihe benefit of claim
preclusion only if he would have been bound by the prior judg-
ment had it gone the other way.38 Although the prosecutors
of the state criminal proceeding were not identical to the defend-
ants in the federal civil rights suit (the city and several individ-
ual city officials), it seems that the interests of the Thistlethwaite
defendants were so closely related to the constitutional consid-
erations involved in the state criminal proceeding that the court
could properly have considered them to be in privity with the
state for the purpose of determining the preclusive effect of the
state judgment.3 7 Thus, lack of mutuality would not by itself
appear to be a sufficiently strong justification under the facts
of Thistlethwaite for the application of issue rather than claim
preclusion.
Ultimately, the most convincing argument for the application
of issue preclusion in Thistlethwaite would have been that upon
proper differentiation of first amendment issues the claims in
the two proceedings would have been found functionally and fac-
tually different.3 8 As Judge Oakes observed:
35. 497 F.2d at 343 n.1.
36. See United States v. Harrison County, 399 F.2d 485, 491 (5th Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 918 (1970); JAMEs § 11.31, at 595. Although
mutuality historically was required for issue as well as claim preclusion,
courts have increasingly applied issue preclusion in certain situations
where traditional mutuality has been found to be lacking. Blonder-
Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50
(1971). See JAvms §§ 11.31, 11.34, at 595, 599. In particular, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit has previously taken the position that,
regardless of the lack of mutuality, issue preclusion may be used defen-
sively, as in Thistlethwaite, against a party who has fully litigated the
issue in a prior action. Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944, 955-56 (2d
Cir. 1964); Spatt v. New York, 361 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff-'d, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973). See also Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tem-
pest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. Rxv. 25, 30-33 (1965).
37. See Spatt v. New York, 361 F. Supp. 1048, 1051 n.2 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973) (Commissioner of Education, Governor, Comp-
troller, and Department of Education considered in privity with state al-
though not parties to first action).
38. There are several theories concerning the proper definition of
a claim for the purpose of determining the scope of claim preclusion, see
JAiMEs § 11.10, at 553-54, and courts exercise some discretion over the
1975]
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[I]t simply is not the same question whether an ordinance re-
quiring permits is unconstitutionally applied by screening appli-
cants by the content of their leaflets or is unconstitutional on
its face so as to void the conviction of one who never knew of
or applied for a permit to distribute.3 9
Since the first amendment issues represented by the first two
modes of attack were distinct from those represented by the third
and fourth modes, 40 appellants should not have been precluded
from litigating the latter modes of attack in federal court. Fur-
thermore, as Judge Oakes also noted, the preclusion resulted in
no real gain in either judicial economy or federal-state comity,
inasmuch as the court's insensitivity to distinctions in the first
amendment issues may well result in "one case to determine
whether there is collateral estoppel [issue preclusion]; [and]
another to raise the issue [on the merits], regardless of the out-
come of the first, for inevitably there are numbers of potential
plaintiffs willing to test such laws ... ."41 Meanwhile, the
Thistlethwaite appellants are abandoned to the mercies of the
permit administrators.
choice of a theory in any particular set of circumstances. See Note, Res
Judicata: Exclusive Federal Jurisdiction and the Effect of Prior State-
Court Determinations, 53 VA. L. Rsv. 1360-61, 1371-75 (1967). The theory
which yields the most inclusive definition is based upon an examination
of factual content: if two respective groups of operative facts should rea-
sonably be treated as a unit, then the claims are said to be the same.
JAMEs § 11.10, at 554. Thus, since the fourth mode of attack would be
based upon events which had occurred after the conclusion of the state
proceeding, see notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text, the claims in
the state and federal suits were distinct under even the broadest defini-
tion of a "claim." But the majority overlooked these events, comment-
ing that the state court had "appl[ied] the regulation in question to facts
identical to those presently alleged .... " 497 F.2d at 342.
39. Id. at 345.
40. See notes 14-28 supra and accompanying text.
41. 497 F.2d at 345.
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